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ABSTRACT. This investigation begins from the hypothesis that social indicators of 
perceived well-being - e.g., people's assessment of their own life quality - will, like 
other atttudes, reflect two basic types of influences: affect and cognition. In addition, 
the indicators were expected to include two other components: unique variance (mainly 
random measurement error) and correlated measurement error. These ideas axe investi- 
gated using a structural modeling approach applied to 23 assessments of life-as-a-whole 
from a national survey of Americans (N = 1072) and/or a survey of urban residents in 
England (iV = 932). In both sets of data, models that included affective and cognitive 
factors fit significantly better than more restricted models. Furthermore, as expected, 
measures of (a) 'happiness', 'fun', and 'enjoyment' tended to be relatively more loaded 
with affect than were measures of (b) 'satisfaction', 'success', and 'meeting needs'; and 
(c) measures designed to tap both affect and cognition tended to fall between the first 
two groups. In addition, the results suggest that measures employing relatively many 
scale points and direct assessments yield more valid indicators of people's evaluations 
of life-as-a-whole than do measures based on three-point scales or on explicit com- 
parisons with other times or groups. These results contribute to basic knowledge about 
the nature of life quality assessments, help to explain some previously puzzling relation- 
ships with demographic factors such as age and education, and may be useful to 
designers of future studies of perceived well-being. 
1. I N T R O D U C T I O N  
Previous research on the nature o f  a t t i tudes suggests that  they include at least 
two  fundamenta l  componen t s :  cognition and affect.  In figurative language, 
cogni t ion  refers to the rational,  ' f rom-the-head ' ,  aspects o f  a person's  
response, while affect  refers to  the emot iona l ,  ' f rom-the-hear t '  (or  ' f rom-the-  
gut ' )  componen t s .  
Measures o f  perceived ( ' subject ive ' )  well-being - one type o f  social indica- 
tor  - are fundamenta l ly  measures o f  a t t i tudes,  and hence can be expec ted  
to reflect  cognitive and affective elements .  Fur the rmore ,  d i f ferent  measures 
o f  perceived well-being can be expec ted  to include different  combina t ions  o f  
cogni t ion  and affect .  In fact ,  this may  explain why dif ferent  measures o f  well- 
being somet imes  show dist inct  pat terns  o f  relat ionships to o ther  variables. 
This article reports  a series o f  explora t ions  in to  the affect ive and cognit ive 
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components of some of the more widely used measures of perceived 
well-being. It is shown that the expected differences among the measures do 
indeed appear and that these differences replicate in independent social 
indicator surveys conducted in the United States and Great Britain. 
From the standpoint of basic science, the research reported here represents 
an attempt to understand some of the fundamental types of influences that 
determine the responses people give when asked about their well-being. From 
a more applied perspective, this report may offer guidance to future inves- 
tigators who face practical problems of selecting or constructing measures 
for use in studies of self-reported life quality. 
In Sections 2 and 3 we briefly review the intellectual heritage out of which 
the present study arises - some recent studies on perception of well-being, 
and some of the relevant past research pertaining to the nature of attitudes, 
respectively. Section 4 describes the 23 measures of global well-being that will 
be the focus of attention here, the two major data sources that have been 
analysed, and the structural-equation methodology that has been employed. 
The statistical results, and certain checks on those results, are presented in 
Section 5. Section 6 summarizes the results and describes some needed 
further research. 
2 .  C O N N E C T I O N S  T O  S O M E  P R E V I O U S  R E S E A R C H  O N  P E R C E I V E D  
W E L L - B E I N G  
The past decade has witnessed an expanding worldwide interest in the compi- 
lation of various types of social indicators. Some of the work has taken the 
form of conducting sample surveys of national, regional or metropolitan 
populations to assess perceptions of well-being - i.e., of people's direct first- 
hand evaluations of the quality of their lives, both in general and with respect 
to numerous specific life concerns (for example, job, family, neighborhood, 
public services, sense of fairness, safety, and many more). Among the major 
recent quality-of-life surveys are those described by Allardt (1973) in 
Scandinavia, Andrews and Withey (1976) and Campbell, Converse, and 
R0dgers (1976) in USA, Abrams (1973) and Hall (1976) in England, and 
Blishen and Atkinson (1978) in Canada. Earlier surveys by Cantril (1966) in 
13 countries and by Bradbum (1969) in USA should also be mentioned. 
These surveys, and many others with similar objectives, have used a variety 
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of  different questions to elicit people's attitudes about their lives. A common 
way to obtain feelings at the most global level has been to ask the simple 
question, "How do you feel about your life as a whole?" and then to provide 
a set of  answer categories that range from 'Delighted' to 'Terrible', or from 
'Completely satisfied' to 'Completely dissatisfied', or from 'The best I could 
expect to have' to 'The worst 1 could expect to have'. There are numerous 
alternatives, however, and sometimes respondents have been asked about 
happiness ( 'How happy are you?') ,  about positive affect ('During the past 
few weeks did you ever feel on top of  the world?'), about negative affect 
('During the past few weeks did you ever feel depressed or very unhappy?') ,  
about the frequency of  worrying, about current mood, and many more. This 
list is not  exhaustive, but serves to illustrate some of  the approaches that have 
been tried. (For a list of  more than 60 different measures of  global well- 
being, a proposed typology for classifying these measures, and information 
on how most of  the measures related to each other in one set of  American 
data, see Andrews and Withey, 1976, Chapter 3.) 
In the most general terms, it can be said that most of the different 
measures of  perceived global well-being have shown broadly similar patterns 
of  relationships to other variables. For example, richer people have expressed 
more positive sentiments than poorer people ; blacks - at least in the United 
States - have rated their life quality lower than have whites; and most of  the 
global measures that have been submitted to multivariate analysis have been 
reasonably predictable by additive combinations of  evaluations of more 
specific life concerns. 
Although the most basic patterns are broadly similar, closer examination 
reveals subtle but potentially important differences among the measures. 
There is no reason to assume that (1) all measures tap people's underlying 
feelings with the same sensitivity, or (2) that all measures tap the same set 
of  underlying feelings. In fact, past research in psychometrics would lead 
one to expect that some answer formats would provide more precise measures 
than other formats, and that different question wordings (e.g., asking about 
'happiness' versus 'satisfaction') would result in measures with different 
orientations. Indeed, the published work on social indicators includes some 
hints that these kinds of  differences do in fact occur. For example, Campbell, 
Converse, and Rodgers (1976) report that feelings of  happiness tended to be 
lower among older people, but that feelings of satisfaction tended to be 
higher. A partial replication is reported by Andrews and Withey (1976): They 
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also found that happiness declined with age (but satisfaction showed no 
clear upward trend). In another example Smith (1978) reports that measures 
of happiness and affect show seasonal variations over the year but that 
measures of satisfaction remain constant. 
The fact that different measures show somewhat different patterns of 
relationships raises the fundamental question, Why? It would seem 
reasonable to suppose that the measures are tapping different components 
of people's attitudes about their own well-being. Given that self-reports of 
well-being are reports about attitudes, and the well-established usefulness of 
analysing attitudes in terms of their affective and cognitive components, it 
seems reasonable to expect that these differences in the measures might be 
attributable to their comprising different combinations of affect and cogni- 
tion. McKennell (1978) and McKennell and Andrews (1980) have presented 
extended theoretical discussions and some empirical data in support of this 
view. 
3. C O N N E C T I O N S  T O  S O M E  P R E V I O U S  R E S E A R C H  O N  T H E  N A T U R E  
O F  A T T I T U D E S  
Interest in the nature of attitudes has a long history in social psychology. 
After reviewing 16 previous definitions of attitude, Allport defined it as fol- 
lows in 1935: "It is a mental and neural state of readiness to respond, organi- 
zed through experience exerting a directive and/or dynamic influence on 
behavior." Forty years later, in another extensive review of the attitude 
literature, Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) defined attitude as: "a learned predis- 
position to respond in a consistently favorable or unfavorable manner with 
respect to a given object." It seems obvious that people's responses to ques- 
tions about perceived well-being in quality-of-life surveys meet the above 
definitions and hence that knowledge about the nature of attitudes may have 
something to contribute to our understanding of self-reports of well-being. 
The idea that mental states may include various conceptually distinct 
components has been around for thousands of years. According to McGuire 
(1968), philosophers have concluded that there are basically three perspectives 
from which the human condition can be viewed: knowing, feeling, and 
acting, and he cites both Hindu and classical Greek sources as proposing 
that attitudes include cognitive, affective, and conative (i.e., behavioral) 
components. A basically similar trilogy of components has been investigated 
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by social psychologists for the past several decades. Ostrom (1969), for 
example, describes the situation as follows: 
At the most global level, attitudes can be characterized as an evaluation of the 
attitude objective on a pro to con continuum. This generalized evaluation can be 
analyzed into three components: affective, behavioral, and cognitive. 
The [affective] component includes.., favorable to unfavorable feelings... [expres- 
sions of] like or dislike, feelings, and emotional and physiological reactions. Perhaps 
the phrase 'gut reaction' best conveys the spirit of this component. 
The [behavioral] component includes.., supportive to hostile actions... [reflecting 1 
personal action tendencies,.., past actions, future intentions, and predicted behavior 
in hypothetical situations. 
The cognitive component includes.., desirable to undesirable qualities... [reflecting] 
values and attributes assigned to the attitude object,.., beliefs about the object, charac- 
teristics of the object, and relationships of the object with other objects (including self). 
Evaluative phrases which are not on the emotional continuum should also be included. 
(Ostrom, 1969, p. 16) 
While the conceptual distinctions between the cognitive, affective, and 
behavioral aspects of  att i tudes seem reasonably clear, the statistical relation- 
ships among these components  are of  some debate.  One could argue - as do 
Insko and Schopler (1967) for example - that a 'triadic consistency'  should 
generally prevail among the three components .  The investigation reported by 
Ostrom (1969) did indeed find high overlaps among the three components.  
Alternatively, one could define the components  to be statistically independent 
of  one another - arguing, for example, that cognitive components  are those 
aspects which are different from (i.e., statistically unrelated to) affective com- 
ponents. For reasons of  convenience, and because of  the nature of  the data 
that are available to us, we adopt this lat ter  strategy, but we also show that 
the degree of  presumed overlap between affect and cognition actually has 
little effect on the general conclusions that will be drawn about the nature 
of  self-reports of  well-being. 
Although investigators of  att i tudes sometimes also consider a behavioral 
component  as part of  an att i tude (and sometimes intentions are further dis- 
tinguished from actual behavior), behavior will not  be considered in the 
present report. The assessments of  perceived well-being that are examined 
below are evaluations of  life quality that have no direct behavioral referents, 
and hence a behavioral component  seems of  little relevance. This is not  to 
say, however, that the measures of  well-being are expected to be statistically 
independent  from either ,actual behavior or behavior intentions: on the con- 
trary, such links probably do exist, but  seem not  to be consti tuent parts of  
the particular survey measures that have been widely used to date. (Explora- 
tion of  these links should be on the agenda for further research.) 
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4 .  D A T A  S O U R C E S ,  M E A S U R E S ,  A N D  E S T I M A T I O N  M E T H O D O L O G Y  
4.1 Data sources 
The data analysed in this report come from two separate surveys. 
One survey was designed to be representative of American adults and was 
based on a probability sample of all American citizens aged 18 and over (and 
married persons under 18) living in households in the continental United 
States (except households on military reservations). These data were collected 
under the direction of Andrews and Withey in November 1972 from 1072 
respondents as part of a larger face-to-face personal interview study (see 
Andrews and Withey, 1976, Appendix B, for further details on sampling 
design, response rates, etc.). Data were collected by trained interviewers of 
the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center. 
The second survey was of British adults. It was conducted in March 1975 
under the direction of Abrams and Hall and was based on a representative 
sample of people aged 16 and over living in British metropolitan areas. The 
number of respondents to this survey was 932. Other analyses of these 
British data have been reported by Abrams (1976) and by Hall (1976). 
4:2 Measures o f  global well-being 
Although plans for the present analyses had not been formulated at the time 
the surveys were originally designed, the desirability of including a wide range 
of different measures of global well-being was clear. Thus it happens that the 
range of measures now at our disposal, while not ideal, is nevertheless rather 
well suited to our needs. 
The analyses reported below focus on 23 different measures of  global well- 
being. Of these, 10 were assessed in the American survey and 16 in the British 
survey (there are three measures that are identical in both surveys)) Exhibit 
1 presents the exact wording of each question and response scale, a short 
code name for each measure, and the source(s) of the data. The heterogeneous 
character of  these various ways of assessing people's feelings about their life- 
as-a-whole is immediately evident. 
The order of presentation within Exhibit 1 is in accord with our initial 
expectations about the relative sensitivity of the measures to affective and 
cognitive elements. The measures can be divided into four groups: 
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Variable's Description Suvey a 
group and name 
Group A 
Life 1 "How do you feel about  your  life as a whole?"  A 
Answered on scale with seven main categories: 
'Delighted, '  'Pleased',  'Mostly satisfied',  'Mixed 
(about  equally satisfied and dissatisfied)' ,  'Mostly 
dissatisfied',  'Unhappy ' ,  'Terrible';  plus several off- 
scale categories - 'Neutral ' ,  and 'I never thought  
about  it '  - which were excluded in analysis. 
Life 2 Same as Life 1 bu t  asked later in the interview. A 
Group B 
Sat 11-pt "All things considered, how satisfied or dissatisfied B 
are you with your  life as a whole these days?"  Eleven 
point  response scale (numbered 0 - 1 0 )  labelled at 
the ends with: 'Dissatisfied' and 'Satisfied'.  
"How satisfied are you  with your  life as a whole A 
these days?"  Seven point  response scale, labelled 
at the ends with:  'Completely satisfied' and 'Com- 
pletely dissatisfied'. 
" In  general, how satisfying do you find the way A 
you ' re  spending your  life these days? Would you call 
it completely satisfying, pret ty satisfying, or not  
very satisfying?" 
" . . .how you feel about  your  present  life": Seven B 
point  response scale labelled at the ends with 
'Makes me completely dissatisfied' and 'Makes 
me completely satisfied'.  
"When you think o f  the things you want f rom B 
life now, would you say you were doing very 
well, fairly well, or no t  too well?" 
" . . .how you feel about  your  present  life": Seven B 
point  response scale labelled at the ends with 
'Unsuccessful '  and 'Successful ' .  
"... how you feel about  your  present  life": Seven B 
point  response scale labelled at the ends with 
'Does not  meet  my  needs in any way'  and 'Meets 
my needs in every way' .  
" . . .how you feel about  your  present  life": Seven B 
point  response scale labelled at the  ends with 'Is 
very much  worse than 1 deserve' and 'Is very much  







Bet th des 
Group C 
Affect  pos Bradburn 's  Positive Affect  Scale: the  number  o f  
five positive events experienced. "During the past few 
weeks did you ever feel ...particularly excited or 
interested in something? .. .proud because someone 
compl imented  you on something you had done? 
...pleased about  having accomplished something? 
...on top o f  the world? ...that things were going 
your  way?"  
A , B  
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Bradburn's Negative Affect Scale: the number of A, B 
five negative events experienced. "During the past 
few weeks did you ever feel ...so restless that you 
couldn't sit long in a chair? ...very lonely or remote 
from other people? ...bored? ... depressed or very 
unhappy? ...upset because someone citicized you?"  
" . . .how you feel about your present life": Seven B 
point response scale labelled at the ends with 'Un- 
happy'  and 'Happy'.  
"Taking all things together, how would you say A, B 
things are these days - would you say you're 
very happy, pretty happy, or not too happy these 
days?" 
". .how you feel about your present life": Seven B 
point response scale labelled at the ends with 
'Makes me extremely unhappy'  and 'Makes me 
extremely happy'.  
"How do you feel about how happy you are?" A 
(Same delighted-terrible response scale as Life 1) 
" . . .how you feel about your present life": Seven B 
point response scale labelled at the ends with 'Full 
of fun' and 'No fun at all'. 
" . . .how you feel about your present life": Seven B 
point response scale labelled at the ends with 
'Enjoyable' and 'Miserable'. 
"Think of  how your life is going now. How much B 
would you like to change your life as it is now?"  
Eleven point response scale (numbered 0 - 1 0 )  
labelled at the ends with 'Not at all' and 'A very 
great deal'. 
"Considering how your life is going, would you A 
like to continue much the same way, change 
some parts of  it, or change many parts of  it?" 
" . . .how you feel about your present life": Seven B 
point response scale labelled at the ends with 
'Will get very much worse in the future'  and 
'Will get very much better in the future'. 
"In general, how much would you say you worry B 
these days?" Same response scale as Change 
11-pt. 
"Where would you put your life as a whole these A 
days on the feeling thermometer?" Vertical 
scale running from "100 ~ - very warm or 
favorable feeling' to '0 ~ - very cold or 
unfavorable feeling' with intermediate numbers 
and labels at 85 ~ , 70 ~ , 60 ~ , 50 ~ , 40 ~ , 30 ~ , and 
15 ~ (see Andrews & Withey, 1976, p. 367, for full 
wording of  intermediate labels). 
a Key to surveys: A = American data (Andrews & Withey, 1976) 
B = British data (Abrams, 1976;Ha11, 1976) 
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A. The first two measures, Life 1 and Life 2, were specifically designed to 
tap both affective and cognitive elements. 
B. The second group consists of  measures that were expected to be 
primarily sensitive to cognitive elements. The first four measures in Group B, 
all of  which assess satisfaction, were expected to be more sensitive to 
cognitive than affective elements because of  the notion that the concept of  
satisfaction requires some kind of  comparison - either explicit or implicit - 
between a level of  achievement and some standard (e.g., what one expects or 
aspires to) and hence involves the kind ofjudgrnental thinking and knowledge 
that is the hallmark of  cognition. The remaining four measures in Group B, 
although not phrased in terms of  satisfaction, were also expected to be 
sensitive primarily to cognitive aspects because each of  these items involves a 
comparison with certain implied or explicit criteria. 
C. The third group consists of  eight measures that were expected to be 
primarily affective in orientation. The first two of  these measures - Brad- 
bum's  scales of  Positive affect and Negative affect - were expected to come 
as close as any of  these measures to representing 'pure'  affect. These two 
scales, each consisting of  five separate items, have been taken directly from 
Bradbum (1969). (His finding - surprising when it first emerged - that these 
measures were uncorrelated with each other replicated in both of  the present 
surveys. The product-moment correlations between these two scales were 
0.01 and 0.00 in the American and British data, respectively.) Next there fol- 
low four items in Group C that ask about happiness. The first three of  these 
happiness items have simple answer scales that were expected to give the 
measure a heavily affective cast; the fourth happiness measure, which was ans- 
wered on a more complex scale that includes ideas of  satisfaction as well as 
affect, was expected to come closer to being 'balanced' with respect to affect 
and cognition than the other three, but still to be primarily affective. The 
final two measures in this group - those asking about fun and enjoyableness 
- were also expected to be predominantly sensitive to affective components. 
D. The fourth group includes five items that clearly tap attitudes about 
global well-being, but for which we had no clear expectations regarding their 
relative sensitivity to affective and cognitive components. Included here are 
two measures that ask about desired changes in the future, another than asks 
about expected changes in the future, one that asks about worries, and a very 
general item about life-as-a-whole answered on a response scale (the feelirfg 
thermometer - widely used for assessing attitudes toward political candidates) 
which provided few clues regarding the likely affective-cognitive balance in 
the answers. 
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4.3 Estimation methods 
General approach. To estimate the sensitivity of global measures of well- 
being to their presumed underlying affective and cognitive elements requires 
that these components be disentangled from each other, and from certain 
other components that will shortly be described. The new technology of 
structural equation modelling with unmeasured variables offers a powerful 
means for accomplishing this. 
What one knows, on the basis of the observed data, is how the various 
measures relate to one another. Using this information jointly with a causal 
model - i.e., with some specific ideas about factors that might have 
influenced the measures and hence affected their covariation - one can seek a 
mutually consistent set of influence estimates that will account for the entire 
set of observed covariations. While one can never 'prove' - in an ultimate 
sense - that a particular causal model is correct, various pieces of evidence 
will determine the degree of confidence one may have in the model. Among 
the criteria are (1) the extent to which the model incorporates current 
thinking about relevant sources of influence, (2) the degree to which the 
model succeeds in accounting for the observed patterns in the data, and (3) 
the reasonableness of the parameter estimates produced by the model, con- 
sidering other things already known or suspected about the measures. 
The models used in the present analyses presume that there are four types 
of influences that may be present, in varying degrees, in measures of global 
well-being. These four are: (1) affective reactions a person has to his or her 
life-as-a-whole; (2) cognitive reactions to life-as-a-whole; (3) reactions that 
have nothing to do with life-as-a-whole but which influence two or more 
of the well-being measures because of the way they were assessed (i.e., 
'correlated errors', or 'methods effects'); and (4) everything else that might 
influence a single measure but which has nothing to do with a person's 
reactions to global well-being (i.e., 'uncorrelated errors'). 
Exhibit 2 presents the model that was applied to the American data. A 
generally similar model was applied to the Britsh data and will be discussed 
later. 
Parameter estimates for this and all other models were computed by 
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LISREL III, a computer program that estimates linear structural equation 
systems by maximum likelihood methods (Joreskog and Sorbom, 1976). 
The basic model. The model portrayed in Exhibit 2 is a straightforward 
implementation of the causal hypotheses sketched previously. Within the 
rectangles on the left and right of Exhibit 2 are the actual measures being 
Items composing Well- being and Measures of 
affect scales methods factor global well- being 
~ P o s i t i v e  affect ~ )~  / 
way I Z Negative affect~[~ CI 4 
- Restless (to eac 
. Lone,, l y /  
9 Bored 
- Oepress-~ p ~ . 7 " [  1" 
.,u0.., , - I -  
~ c 2 - - - - ' [ C h ~ 1 7 6  ~-----~ 1" 
Cto e a c h ) f ~  I ,he.~et~ 14 
EXHIBIT 2 
The structural  model  that  was applied to American data. 
analysed. The first block of five rectangles on the left contains the items 
that constitute Bradbum's Positive affect scale, and the second block, of five 
\ 
contains the items of the Negative affect scale (see Exhibit 1). On the right 
are eight measures of global well-being. It is the interrelationships among 
these 18 items that this model seeks to explain. The model assumes that the 
relationships vary because the measures are differentially sensitive to some 
of the same underlying sources of influence. 
The arrows going to each rectangle symbolize inputs from particular 
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sources of influence. Although not shown in Exhibit 2, each arrow carries 
a number (a 'parameter estimate') which indicates how much influence enters 
along that path. 
The three ovals in the upper center of Exhibit 2 represent the affective 
and cognitive reactions which we presume people have to their life-as-a-whole. 
Note that the affective reactions have been separated into positive and 
~aegative components (in accord with Bradburn's findings mentioned above). 
The absence of any direct connections among these three ovals indicates that 
they will be treated as three statistically independent influences. (The effects 
of allowing certain departures from independence among these factors was 
the topic of some subsidiary investigations that are discussed later.) 
The three ovals in the lower portion of the exhibit represent three types of 
methods effects. Because some people use a particular response scale in one 
way - for personal or stylistic reasons that have nothing to do with their feelings 
of well-being - while others use that scale in another way, there is likely to 
be a spurious component to relationships between measures that use the same 
or similar response scales. By explicitly incorporating method effect factors 
in the model, one can separate out these spurious relationships from the more 
fundamental links to affect and cognition that are of primary interest. 
Method factor A links to the three items that use the 7-point Delighted- 
terrible response scale, and also to the 7-point satisfaction measure that 
used a somewhat similar scale. (As indicated by the Cl's in the exhibit, the 
magnitude of Methods effect A was constrained to be equal for each of the 
measures using the Delighted-terrible scale, but was allowed to be of different 
magnitude for the 7-point satisfaction measure.) Method factor B links to the 
three measures that have similar three-category response scales; the c2 's in the 
exhibit indicate that this method effect was constrained to be equal for each 
of these measures. Finally, Method factor C links to each of the 10 affect 
items, all of which were answered in a simple yes-no format; the ca in the 
exhibit indicates that all of these method effects were constrained to be 
equal. 
In addition to the inputs from affect, cognition, and shared methods 
effects, each measure is presumed to include certain random (i.e., 
uncorrelated) errors. The short arrows entering each rectangle from the peri- 
meter of the exhibit represent the influences of these random errors. (Because 
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the Thermometer measure uses a response scale different from that of  any 
other measure in this analysis, any effect attributable to that scale will be 
included in the uncorrelated error component of  this measure.) 
The substantive meaning o f  the unmeasured causal va~ables. A reasonable 
concern, when one examines a model such as that po r t r~ed  in Exhibit 2, 
is with the 'meaning' of  the unmeasured variables indicatec~by" the ovals. 
What leads one to believe that they operate in accord with the labels that 
have been placed on them? The answer lies in how the ovals a~e linked, or 
not linked, to each other and to the observed measures, and in how these 
linkages have been controlled (e.g., by constraining them to be equal) (Burt, 
1976). 
In the case o f  the factor labelled Positive affect, this factor was expected 
to act like pure positive affect because it is the only factor that can uniquely 
explain the covariation among the iter0s of  Bradbum's Positive affect scale, 
covariation which - as noted previously - was presumed to result from these 
items' common sensitivity to positive affect. (Note that the Methods factor C, 
because all its links are constrained to be equal, can represent only something 
that all five positive affect items and all five negative affect items have in 
common and to the same degree, and hence this factor will not pick up 
positive affect.) 
Parallel comments explain why the Negative affect factor was expected to 
come reasonably close to representing pure negative affect. 
Unfortunately, none of  the available measures seemed even close to being 
an indicator of  pure cognition. Accordingly, the cognitive factor has been 
defined through a process of  residualization. The cognitive factor is what the 
global well-being measures share that is not affect (either positive or negative) 
and that is not attributable to common method effects. This approach to 
defining a cognition factor, despite its being indirect, seems well supported by 
both theory and analytic results. As noted in Section 3 of  this paper, there is 
substantial evidence that some kind of  cognitive mental process seems to be 
one of  the underlying factors that influence attudes. And, as we have shown 
elsewhere (McKennell and Andrews, 1980), a cognitive factor residualized as 
here: (1) does make a useful contribution to explaining the pattern ofcovar- 
iations among global measures of  well-being; (2) yields highly consistent 
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factor loadings across a substantial variety of causal models; and (3) shows 
replicable cross-national results. 
While the ability to estimate the parameters of structural equations in- 
corporating unmeasured variables, as required by the model portrayed in 
Exhibit 2, represents a very important and quite recent technological 
development, it must be recognized that the values obtained are only 
estimates of what may go on in the real world. We believe the model ap- 
propriately incorporates past and current theorizing about the nature of 
attitudes and about likely sources of errors in observed measures, and, 
furthermore, the model does indeed explain the relationships among the 
measures rather well and on the basis of reasonable parameter estimates 
(as will be detailed in Section 5). Nevertheless, there is no direct way to 
'prove' that results from applying this model are precisely correct. What 
seems important at this point is to observe that nothing to date has suggested 
a fundamental flaw in the model or its application, and that although the 
numerical values of some of the parameter estimates will vary according to 
certain assumptions made in specifying the model, the overall pattern of 
results, and hence the general conclusions to be derived from them, seem 
not to be heavily dependent on these assumptions. 
5. R E S U L T S  
This section begins by presenting the results from the analysis of measures in 
the American data. Then follows a description of results from the British 
data. Finally a series of subsidiary analyses designed to check the sensitivity 
of the conclusions to various assumptions made in the main analyses are 
presented. 
5.1 Measures in the American data 
Exhibit 3 presents the results of applying the model portrayed in Exhibit 2 to 
the well-being measures included in the American survey. Before turning to 
its 12 columns of information, however, it is important to report that the 
model performed quite satisfactorily in accounting for the variances and 
covariances among the measures. 2 There were a total of 171 such variance 
or covariance statistics to be 'explained', and the average predicted value of 
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each was within -+ 0.04 of  the observed value and in no case was a prediction 
off  by as much as 0.19. 
In Exhibit 3, columns 3 - 9  indicate the sensitivity of  the well-being 
measures to various components of  attitudes about life-as-a-whole, columns 
10 and 11 indicate sensitivity to other influences (correlated and random 
measurement errors), and column 12 is a total. Note that the figures under 
'Other '  components are subdivided into two types of  components: Correlated 
measurement error variance attributable to a measure's sharing common 
response scales (shown in column 10), and unique variance (shown in column 
11), most of  which is probably random measurement error, but some of  
which might be a measure's valid reflection of  attitudes that have nothing to 
do with feelings about life-as-a-whole. Note, also, that the figures for the 
totals in column 12 all come close to 100%, as one would expect. (The small 
discrepancies from 100% are primarily attributable to the model's not  being 
able to account precisely for all the variance of  each measure while simulta- 
neously having to account for all the other variances and covariances.) 
The results shown in Exhibit 3 are generally in accord with our expecta- 
tions, sketched earlier, about the composition of  these global measures. How- 
ever, there is one substantial surprise, and a few other results may call for 
adjustments in our expectations. 
As noted in the initial discussion of  the measures, the Group A measures - 
Life 1 and Life 2 - were expected to reflect substantial amounts of  both 
affect and cognition. The affect-cognition ratios presented in column 7 show 
that the two types of  components come close to being balanced in these 
measures. In the case of  Life 1, the ratio of  0.8 is based on estimates that 
26% of  the variance reflects affective components and 33% reflects cognitive 
components (see columns 5 and 6). Furthermore, the affective component 
is itself evenly divided between positive and negative affect - 13% of the 
measure's variance being attributable to each, as is shown in columns 1 and 2. 
For Life 2, the affect-cognition ratio is nearly the same, at 0.7, as it is for Life 
1, and none of  the variance component estimates differ in a statistically 
significant way from those for Life 1.3 For an indication of  the extent 
to which the Life 1 and Life 2 measures are sensitive to feelings about life-as- 
a-whole, one may refer to column 8 o f  the exhibit, where it is shown that 
approximately 60% of  the variance of  these measures (59% and 61%, res- 
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sum of columns 5 and 6). Since some readers will be accustomed to 'validity 
coefficients' as these are reported in the psychometric literature, column 9 
reports the measure's estimated sensitivity to aspects of  life-as-a-whole in this 
form - 0.77 and 0.78 for Life 1 and Life 2, respectively. (Column 9 is simply 
the square root of  column 8.) Finally, the model indicates that about 10% of 
each measure's variance is attributable to common methods effects, and 
that another 2 5 - 3 1 %  is attributable to other unique sources (mainly random 
measurement error). 
Thus the first part of  Exhibit 3 contains no surprises, and in fact this 
characterization of  the Life measures, while considerably more detailed than 
those available previously, is in excellent accord with previous analyses of  
these same data and with validity estimates for these measures when they 
were included in other data (e.g., Andrews and Withey, 1976, Chapter 6). 
The surprises in Exhibit 3 come with respect to the Group B measures - 
the 7-point and 3-point satisfaction measures. It was expected that including 
the term 'satisfaction' in the question would make these measures somewhat 
more cognitive in orientation than the Life measures. That this seems not to be 
the case, however, can be seen by the affect-cognition ratios in column 7. 
The 7-point satisfaction measure has a ratio of  0.8, very similar to the Life 
measures, and the 3-point satisfaction measure has a ratio o f  1.2, and hence 
is somewhat m o r e  affectively oriented than the Life measures. In fact, the 7- 
point satisfaction measure' differs in only minor respects from the Life 
measures; it seems slightly less sensitive to both affect and cognition, and the 
balance of  positive and negative affect tilts slightly toward negative affect. 4 
The 3-point satisfaction measure, besides having a surprisingly affective 
cast, seems notably less valid as an indicator of  attitudes about life-as-a-whole 
(e.g., note columns 8 and 9). While the relatively affective cast of  this 
measure was not expected, its lower overall sensitivity to attitudes about life- 
as-a-whole is just what one would expect on the basis o f  this measure's having 
only three response categories. There is substantial evidence that small 
numbers of  answer categories ( 2 - 4 )  tend to reflect less true variance than 
larger numbers (5 or more) - see, for example, Cochran, 1968; Connor, 
1972; Ramsay, 1973. The results in Exhibit 3 are consistent with this: Three 
of  the four lowest validity coefficients (in column 9) are for measures using 
3-point response scales. 
The two happiness measures, Group C in Exhibit 3, are, as expected, 
relatively more affectively oriented than the Life measures (note their affect- 
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cognition ratios of 2.2 and 1.0). Furthermore, again as expected, the Happy 
D-T measure is compositionally closer to the Life measures (which use the 
same D-T scale) than the 3-point happiness measure. The balance of positive 
and negative affect in both of these happiness measures (which is in favor of  
positive affect) is just opposite to that in the two satisfaction measures 
(where negative affect predominates). Finally, one may note that while the 
3-point happiness measure has a high affect-cognition ratio, this ratio is high 
not because the measure is especially sensitive to affective components, but 
because it is especially insensitive to cognitive components; unfortunately, 
the overall validity of this measure is only modest /  
The two measures in Group D - 3-point change and feelings about life-as- 
a-whole measured on the Thermometer scale - were ones about which we 
had no clear expectations regarding sensitivity to affect and cognition. In 
these data the affect-cognition ratios show the change measure to be weighted 
in favor of affect (and this is mainly negative affect - see columns 1 and 2), 
and the Thermometer measure to be weighted in favor of cognition. However, 
of all the measures in Exhibit 3, these two seem least sensitive to feelings 
about life-as-a-whole (note their low validities, in columns 8 and 9, and the 
large amounts of unique variance, in column 11). 
Before describing some of the subsidiary analyses done to check the 
stability of these findings, or considering the implications these results have 
for people with practical concerns about measuring well-being, we present 
the results from the British survey, since in many ways they replicate and 
extend the pattern of the present findings. 
5.2 Measures in the British data 
The model that was applied to the British data was highly similar to that used 
for the American data and shown in Exhibit 2. There were only two modifi- 
cations: (1) instead of including all 10 individual components of Bradbum's 
scales of Positive and Negative affect, the sclaes themselves were substituted, 6 
and (2) because the measures used response scales that differed from the 
American survey, the methods factors had to be altered. 7 
The model applied to the British measures came even closer to reproducing 
their observed variances and covariances than did the model applied to the 
American data. The average (absolute) discrepancy between the observed and 
estimated values was only 9 0.02, and the highest discrepancy among all 136 
was less than 0.12. As may be seen in column 12 of Exhibit 4, the model 
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came reasonably close to accounting for 100% of the total variance of each 
measure. 
Exhibit 4 presents the main statistical results for the British data and is 
laid out parallel with Exhibit 3. The British data included no measures in 
Group A, so the exhibit begins with the Group B measures - those that were 
expected to be relatively more sensitive to cognitive components than the 
measures included in Group C. A glance at the affect-cognition ratios in 
Exhibit 4 will confirm that this is indeed the case for most of the measures: 
The Group B measures tend to have lower ratios than the Group C measures. 
In fact, out of 30 comparisons between measures in Group B and C, only two 
comparisons run counter to the expected direction, and for neither of these is 
the discrepancy substantial. 
Several of the Group C measures - Enjoyable, Fun, and Happy 7opoint - 
appear very heavily loaded with affective components, as does one of the 
Group D measures. For these measures the affect-cognition ratios range from 
4.0 up to 13.5. For example, Exhibit 4 estimates the Enjoyable measure as 
consisting of 27% affective variance, approximately evenly split between 
positive and negative affect, and only 2% cognitive variance, for an affect- 
cognition ratio of 13.5. The Worry measure also has a ratio at about the same 
level, but here nearly all of the affect is negative affect, a characteristic that 
seems intuitively reasonable. The Fun measure, in contrast, is estimated to 
be twice as sensitive to positive affect as to negative affect and (like Enjoyable 
and Worry) very little influenced by cognitive components. None of these 
measures with relatively heavy emphasis on affective components, however, 
shows more than mediocre validity (see columns 8 and 9 of Exhibit 4). 
While the broad patterns evident in Exhibit 4 tend to be in accord with 
our initial expectations, and to replicate the major patterns in the American 
data, there are some interesting discrepancies between the U.S. and British 
results. 
One can note, for example, that measures that ask about happiness in the 
British data tend to tilt in favor of  negative affect, while the American data 
showed happiness items tending toward positive affect. (On the other hand, 
the satisfaction items tilt toward negative affect in both the British and 
American data sets). One can also observe that Change ll-point, a British 
measure, seems primarily sensitive to cognitive components, while the 3-point 
change measure, which occurs in the American data, was more sensitive to 
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8 and 9) for measures in the American data tend to come out somewhat 
higher than in the British data. Whether these differences reflect true cultural 
differences, or result from different methodological contexts in which the 
data were collected and analysed, or both, cannot be immediately deter- 
mined. 
One difference between the British and American results that is im- 
mediately obvious, but which may be an artifact of assumptions made in 
specifying the model, is the fact that most measures that can be matched 
between the two surveys seem more sensitive to affective components in the 
British data. Note, for example, that the Group B measures in the American 
data have affect-cognition ratios of about 1.0, but that in the British data 
the ratios for measures in this group run from 0.9 up to 1.9. While this 
could reflect a cultural difference, we know from the experimentation 
described in note 7 that the size of the affect-cognition ratios is heavily 
dependent on assumptions made in specifying the model (but that these 
assumptions do not greatly influence the rank order of the ratios which are 
the primary focus of otir attention). 
5.3 Further analyses 
In addition to the two main analyses just described, a number of additional 
analyses were performed to check the stability of the results under alternative 
assumptions and to see whether certain demographic variables would relate 
in expected ways to the factors of affect and cognition. One set of subsidiary 
analyses that checked the sensitivity of the British results to alternative 
assumptions about the validity of the affect scales has already been described 
in note 7 and needs only to be referenced here. Several other analyses, how- 
ever, also merit attention. 
Age and education related to affect and cognition. One of the empirical 
observations that suggested one consider separate factors that might underlie 
well-being measures was the finding that happiness and satisfaction showed 
different relationships to the age of respondents. (Happiness declined with 
age, satisfaction did not.) By adding age (and also education) to the model 
shown in Exhibit 2, we could examine the relationships of these variables 
to the unmeasured factors of affect and cognition that we presumed underlay 
the measures of global well-being, a The results for age were very much as 
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expected: Age related negatively to both the positive and negative affect 
factors (-0.25 and -0.22,  respectively), and positively to the cognition 
factor (+0.08). Education showed a different pattern: It related positively 
to positive affect (+0.28), and negatively to the negative affect and cognition 
factors (-0.07 and -0.12,  respectively). Thus this analysis provided 
confirmation that the affect and cognition factors as operationalized in the 
model would relate differently to outside variables, and with patterns that 
seemed reasonable in the light of previous evidence. Since it was the differing 
patterns of relationships between well-being measures and age that had 
stimulated our initial interest in distinguishing affective and cognitive factors, 
being able to demonstrate that these factors as implemented in our model 
would indeed relate differently to outside variables was of considerable 
importance. 
The relationship between positive affect and negative affect. One of the as- 
sumptions built into the model in Exhibit 2 is that the positive affect factor 
is statistically independent from the negative affect factor. While this assump- 
tion is in accord with Bradbum's findings that the two affect scales were 
statistically independent from each other and showed different patterns of 
relationships with other variables, the conclusion about the independence of 
positive and negative affect has been questioned by other investigators 
(Cherlin and Reeder, 1975; Brenner, 1975). 
The implications of correlated error in the affect items for the observed 
zero correlation has not been considered in the literature. For example, it is 
entirely possible that the true underlying correlation between positive and 
negative affect could be negative but that measures tapping these affects 
could yield an observed correlation of zero because correlated errors would 
essentially cancel out the 'true' negative relationship, particularly after this 
had been attenuated by the effects of random error. This is a topic that needs 
further investigation. 
In fact, tests with our model show that a good fit to the data could be 
achieved assuming any relationship ranging from 0 to 1.0 between the 
affect factors simply by allowing compensating changes in the impacts of 
Methods factor C. Thus it was important to see whether the basic conclu- 
sions described earlier regarding the order of the measures with respect to 
their relative sensitivity to affect and cognition would change if the positive 
and negative affect factors were allowed to be related to one another. 
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Accordingly two further models were run in which the affect factors were 
related to one another -0 .50  and -0.88.  The affect-cognition ratios 
continued to order the measures in essentially the same way as in Exhibit 3 
(where the relationship between the affect factors was fixed at zero). 9 Hence 
our major conclusions are not dependent on the assumption of independence 
between the affect factors. Furthermore, not only does the order of the 
measures on the affect-cognition ratio stay about the same, but so also do 
the values of the ratios themselves. For example, the Life 1 measure has an 
affect-cognition ratio of 0.8 under the assumption of independence between 
affect factors (as shown in Exhibit 3) and 0.9 when we assume the affect 
factors correlate -0.88.  
The relationship between the affect factors and the cognition factor. Another 
assumption incorporated in the model in Exhibit 2 is that cognition is 
appropriately defined as being statistically independent of  affect. While such 
a definition for cognition has an appealing elegance and simplicity to it, one 
could imagine counter-arguments that would suggest that relationships might 
occur between cognition and the two affect factors. Are the results presented 
earlier sensitive to what one assumes about these relationships? Although we 
have not actually run versions of the basic model that incorporate this 
change, other modelling work we have performed is instructive on this 
point. In the basic model (Exhibit 2), cognition is essentially a correlated 
residual: Cognition is what well-being measures have in common that is not 
affect and not shared methods effects. If  cognition were allowed to be 
related to the affect factors, the cognitive factor would no longer be a pure 
residual but would also provide an alternative linkage between measures of 
well-being and the items in the affect scales. The effect would be that the 
measures would be estimated to be relatively more sensitive to cognitive 
components and less sensitive to affective components. Although the affect- 
cognition ratios would tend to decrease, there is no reason to expect that the 
relative positions of  the measures according to these ratios would change. In 
short, the basic pattern of results reported previously would remain stable. 
6. S U M M A R Y  A N D  C O N C L U S I O N S  
Beginning from the observations that measures of perceived well-being are 
attitudes, and that prior research suggests that attitudes include affective 
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and cognitive components, we have analysed a substantial set of evaluations 
of life-as-a-whole (23 measures in all) to try to determine the extent to which 
each reflects affective, cognitive, and other components. 
We find that the measures do indeed differ in a number ot interesting ways 
that are of potential importance both theoretically and practically. Most of 
these differences are in close accord with what a careful consideration of the 
content and form of the item and its response scale would lead one to expect. 
Furthermore, the patterns of differences are basically similar in two represen- 
tative but independent sets of data - one collected in the United States, the 
other collected in Great Britain. 
For most of  the measures examined, the total variance has been apportion- 
ed among five different components by using a structural modelling ap- 
proach. These components are: positive affect, negative affect, cognition, 
common methods effect (mainly correlated error), and unique effects 
(mainly random error). Except for the fact that together these components 
should account for 100% of a measure's variance, each of these components 
is free to vary in any amount, and the resulting range of possible 'mixtures' 
could be - and in fact was found to be - substantial. 
The estimated composition of each measure, i.e., the extent to which each 
measure reflects each of the five components, has been fully described above, 
and here only three of the main trends will be summarized. 
1. If one considers the ratio o f  affective to cognitive components,  one 
finds that some measures are much more affectively oriented than others. 
This finding, replicated in both the British and American data, is one of the 
basic justifications for distinguishing these components. Doing so represents 
a conceptual and statistical refinement over a common past practice of con- 
sidering that all global measures are simply reflections (perhaps to differing 
degrees) of a single underlying factor, feelings about life-as-a-whole. Measures 
that ask about happiness, fun, and enjoyableness (in addition to Bradburn's 
scales of positive and negative affect) fall in the group for which relatively 
high affect-cognition ratios were observed. On the other hand, items that 
employ the term 'satisfaction' and/or that involve comparisons with implicit 
or explicit criteria tend to have lower affect-cognition ratios. 
2. One can also consider the ratio o f  the two types o f  affect - i.e., 
whether the measure tilts toward positive or negative affect, or is reasonably 
balanced between the two. The data suggest that satisfaction measures tend 
to tap more negative than positive affect and that in the Unired States (but 
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not in Great Britain) the reverse is true for happiness measures. In the British 
data, an item that asked about fun was much more sensitive to positive than 
negative affect, whereas an item that asked about worries was heavily loaded 
with negative affect. 
3. Still another way measures can be compared is with regard to the ratio 
o f  the ir  e s t i m a t e d  true variance to to ta l  variance - i.e., the percentage of 
their total variance that is estimated to tap feelings about life-as-a-whole 
rather than reflecting common methods effects or unique sources, most of 
which would probably be random errors. In one sense, this is an examination 
of the internal validity of the measures. There was a rather consistent 
tendency for measures employing 3-point response scales to show lower 
validities than measures with scales having more response categories. It also 
appears that explicitly comparative measures, i.e., ones that involve com- 
parisons over time or with other groups, are markedly less valid as reflectors 
of absolute evaluations of life-as-a-whole than are measures that call for a 
direct assessment. 
Given that different measures are differentially sensitive to positive affect, 
negative affect, cognition, and other (mainly error) factors, as this analysis 
and others reported by McKennell (1978) and McKennell and Andrews (1980) 
have shown, it seems important that designers, analysers, and users of surveys 
that assess perceived well-being should be sensitive to some of the issues 
involved. If  one wants to assess absolute evaluations of perceived well-being, 
then one should seek measures that do this well; these will be the measures 
with relatively high validity coefficients. However, one faces further decisions 
regarding the desired mixture of affects and cognition: mainly cognition, 
mainly positive affect, mainly negative affect, or some balance among the 
three. Unfortunately, the issues do not stop with making these choices, 
because the current portfolio of available measures is far from complete 
and the ideal measure for a particular purpose may not exist. 
While we believe that a useful start has been made toward furthering 
knowledge about the nature and characteristics of well-being measures, 
there is much further research and development that needs to be undertaken. 
The list of activities would include at least the following: (1) The present 
paper deals exclusively with well-being measures at the global level, i.e., ones 
that assess life-as-a-whole. Theoretical considerations we have laid out else- 
where (McKennell and Andrews, 1980) strongly suggest that the separate 
influences of affect and cognition also need to be explored at the level of 
152 F R A N K  M. A N D R E W S  A N D  A U B R E Y  C. M C K E N N E L L  
evaluations of  specific life concerns ( 'domains').  So far as we know, no appro- 
priate data for doing this now exist, but they could be developed. (2) As just 
noted above, even at the global level the portfolio o f  available measures is 
far from complete. Work needs to be done to develop valid measures that 
would have more purely cognitive orientations. (3) We believe that the 
question of  what negative relationship, if any, exists between positive and 
negative affect needs investigation. As reported above, some initial analyses 
show that the surprising (but replicable) zero relationship between measures 
of  these factors could be attributable to correlated methods effects. Further 
work on affect that makes due allowance for random and correlated errors in 
measurement and that examines how the affect factors relate to a variety 
of  outside variables would be useful. (4) Finally, we feel that much additional 
work needs to be undertaken regarding the differential relationships of  affect 
and cognition to a wide variety of  outside variables: respondents' behaviors - 
past, current, and future, respondents' demographic characteristics, and 
respondents' social settings as assessed by 'objective' social indicators. As 
noted previously, hints of  such differential relationships led to the present 
investigation, and we have reported above that our modelling analyses were 
responsive to such differences, but this topic has only been opened. This 
fourth undertaking seems a [ rticularly promising approach both for 
suggesting how people come to evaluate their lives as they do (a basic causal 
question for research on social indicators) and for suggesting some of  the 
implications of  people's evaluations (a basic effects question). 
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NOTES 
* We are grateful to John Hall and Mark Abrams for providing us with a copy of their 
data, to Mary Grace Moore for data processing, and to Suzanne Gurney for typing 
assistance. Grant #SOC77-06525 from the National Science Foundation supported 
the analysis reported here. Some of these results were presented at the Annual Meeting 
of the American Psychological Association, New York, 1979. 
i In this counting Bradbum's scales of positive and negative affect are treated as single 
measures. Each of these scales is based on five items (as shown in Exhibit 1), and in the 
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analysis of the American data these individual items, rather than the composite scales, 
were used. 
2 As is common practice in analyses of this type, all variables were standardized prior to 
being analysed - i.e., transformed to have means of zero and variances of 1.0. This 
transformation has no effect at all on the main substantive results presented here but 
makes many of the parameter estimates more immediately interpretable. 
3 The LISREL program computes standard errors for the model's parameter values, and 
none of the parameters involving Life 1 and Life 2 differ by even as much as one 
standard error. 
4 These comparisons between the Satisfaction and Life measures, as well as other com- 
parisons to be discussed later, raise issues of the statistical significance of the observed 
differences. While theory as well as statistical significance needs to be considered in inter- 
preting a set of results (Morrison and Henkel, 1970), we have performed about forty 
tests on selected differences shown in Exhibits 3 and 4 using a test described by McNemar 
(1972, p. 140). (This test compares two relationships computed for the same set of 
respondents and is relevant because the measurement model parameters used to derive 
Exhibits 3 and 4 may be thought of as factor loadings or correlation coefficients.) The 
overall pattern of results from these significance tests is clear: Given the sizes of our 
samples, most differences in Exhibits 3 and 4 of 8 percentage points or more meet 
conventional criteria for statistical significance (p. < 0.05), and most differences of 5 
to 7 percentage points are at the margin of statistical significance (0.05 < p < 0.1). 
5 In addition to the Group C measures shown in Exhibit 3, the analysis included the 10 
items that compose Bradburn's scales of positive and negative affect. Although these 
items are not the primary focus of this report, in order that all estimates from the model 
may be available, we here report the estimated variance components for these 10 
measures. The percent of variance attributable to positive affect in the first five items 
(ordered as shown in Exhibit 2) was: 12%, 27%, 43%, 22%, and 34%; the percent of 
variance attributable to negative affect in the second five items was: 19%, 37%, 31%, 
51%, and 11%; the percent of variance attributable to a common methods effect in all 
10 items was 2%; and the percent of variance estimated to be unique in each item was: 
86%, 70%, 55%, 76%, 64%, 78%, 61%, 67%, 47%, and 86%. Although Bradburn's 
positive and negative affect scales Themselves were not included in the analysis of the 
American data, by knowing the relationships between those scales and other global 
measures, and the estimated variance composition of the global measures (reported in 
Exhibit 3), we can estimate that both the Positive affect and Negative affect scales have 
validities of approximately 0.87 (i.e., that approximately 76% of each scale's variance 
represents the intended affect factor and that approximately 24 % is error). 
The use of single multi-item affect scales to define the affect factors rather than five 
separate items required an a priori estimation of the validity of these scales. After exa- 
mining the American data, where our results suggested the multi-item affect scales 
would each have had validity of about 0.87 (see note 6), and after finding somewhat 
lower relationships among the individual affect items in the British data, an estimated 
validity of 0.80 was used. Several alternative validity values (0.87, 0.70, 0.50) were also 
tried, and it was determined that while the assumed validities of the affect scales have a 
substantial effect on the estimated affect-cognition ratio for the measures (column 7 
in Exhibit 4), and for the statistics on which this ratio depends (columns 3-6) ,  the 
rank order of the measures with respect to this ratio tends not to change markedly. 
(Land and Felson (1978) discuss the rationale behind this kind of exploration of the 
sensitivity of results to assumptions made when specifying the model.) 
7 Three separate types of response scales are represented among the 14 measures of 
global well-being in the British data and shown in Exhibit 4. These are: 3-point scales 
(Doing well and Happy 3-point), 11-point scales (Sat 11-pt, Change 11-pt, and Worry), 
and 7-point scales (all 9 remaining measures). As in the model shown in Exhibit 2, a 
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separate methods factor was defined for each type of response scale and linked to all 
measures that employed that scale. All the links from any one methods factor were 
constrained to have equal parameter estimates. (In order for this equality constraint 
to work as intended, it was necessary that all measures be scored in the same direction, 
i.e., numerically higher scores had to imply more positive evaluations, and since four 
of the measures -Enjoyable, Fun, Worry, and Change 11-pt - had been presented to 
respondents in the opposite direction, their scores were reversed.) 
8 Incorporation of age and education into the model shown in Exhibit 2 was accom- 
plished by adding age and education to the list of observed measures, by adding an age 
factor and an education factor to the set of unmeasured variables, by fixing the linkage 
of each of these two factors with its respective indicator at 1.0, and by estimating all 
the linkages involving these two new factors and the previous three substantive factors, 
positive affect, negative affect, and cognition. As the analysis was actually run, all 
previous free and constrained parameters were re-estimated, but  most changed very 
little from what has already been reported in Exhibit 3. 
9 In the most extreme case (assuming a -0 .88 relationship between the affect factors), 
the order of the measures on the affect-cognition ratio was: Thermometer, Life 1, Sat 
7-pt, Life 2, Happy D-T, Sat 3-pt, Change, and Happy 3-pt. This sequence has a rank 
order correlation of +0.9 with the order shown in Exhibit 3. 
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